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Standardization and the Impacts of Voluntary Program Participation: Evidence from
Environmental Auditing

1.

Introduction
In recent years, participation in voluntary environmental programs and other

forms of industry self-regulation has received increased emphasis from both regulators
and scholars as a potential means of improving compliance with environmental
regulations. 1 As noted by Khanna and Broule [3], the number voluntary programs
sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grew dramatically from
28 programs in 1996 to 54 in 1999 and to 87 in 2005. Although the growth of these
programs has slowed in the Obama administration, EPA continues to support a large
number of voluntary initiatives, with more recent programs focused on energy and
climate change. 2 A number of studies have examined the incentives for participation in
voluntary programs and/or the effectiveness of participation on environmental
performance. 3 The empirical evidence on program effectiveness is mixed with some
studies showing modest success and others showing no discernable impacts, even among
analyses that focus on the same program. One possible explanation for these mixed
results is that many voluntary programs focus on encouraging firms to participate
whereas compliance with formal environmental regulations is usually assessed at
the facility level.

1

This appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by significant reductions in enforcement resources at
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which decreased by 5 percent in real terms between 1997 and
2006 [1]. Kotchen [2] cites the political feasibility of agency-sponsored voluntary programs as one factor
explaining their proliferation.
2
See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/voluntaryprograms.html for information on these
programs.
3
See Khanna and Brouhle [3] and Prakash and Potoski [4] for reviews.
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Non-mandatory approaches to environmental protection encompass a diverse set
of programs but, relative to formal regulation, most voluntary programs allow
participating entities a greater degree of flexibility in implementation. For many
voluntary programs, a participating firm can implement the program at some of its
facilities but not at others or can implement a different set of program-related actions at
each of its facilities. However, this decision making process is generally unobserved. In
most instances, only the firm-level decision about whether or not to participate is known.
Thus empirical efforts to examine the effects of voluntary program participation on
environmental performance often require the researcher to make an assumption about the
nature of program participation and, ultimately, the process of decision-making within
multi-facility firms. Constraints imposed by available data usually drive this assumption
as many empirical studies only have data on participation at the firm level and assume,
explicitly or implicitly, a standardized application of the voluntary program across all
facilities owned by a firm. For the most part these empirical analyses have not accounted
for the possibility of heterogeneous application of the voluntary program across the
firm’s various facilities.
The goal of this paper is to better understand how firms make decisions about
facility-level participation in voluntary programs and how this process impacts our ability
to make valid inferences about the effects of participation on environmental performance.
We develop a theoretical model that identifies the conditions under which a multi-facility
firm chooses to employ a standardized adoption policy for a voluntary program rather
than a heterogeneous policy in which some of the firm’s facilities adopt the program
while others do not. The model suggests that the incentives for a firm to employ a
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standardized adoption policy weaken as the degree of heterogeneity among facilities
owned by a firm increases. This intuitive result holds whether the firm uses a centralized
or decentralized decision-making structure and calls into question the frequently invoked
assumption that the decision to adopt a voluntary program is uniformly applied to all of a
firm’s facilities. We then test this model empirically to see whether our theoretical
predictions of the factors that encourage firms to standardize adoption decisions hold. In
particular, we use a firm-level dataset on the adoption of a voluntary environmental
program, an environmental audit, across a firm’s facilities. We also examine the effect of
adoption on facility compliance using both firm-level and facility-level controls. Since
the incentives for adoption of an environmental auditing program are similar to those for
adoption of other voluntary environmental programs, we believe that the results of our
study can provide insight for evaluating a wide range of voluntary environmental
programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
previous empirical studies that analyze the impacts of voluntary program participation
with a focus on environmental auditing as well as another well-known voluntary
program, the EPA’s 33/50 program. Section 3 develops a model of program adoption
within a multi-facility firm to explore the incentives for employing a standardized versus
a heterogeneous adoption policy. In Section 4, we test the model’s implications in a firmlevel analysis of the decision to adopt a standardized auditing policy and find results
broadly consistent with our theoretical predictions. In section 5, we further explore the
implications of our model using a facility-level empirical analysis of the effect of audit
adoption on compliance. We find that when we include both a facility-level adoption
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measure and firm-level controls in our empirical analysis, auditing does not have a
significant effect on compliance. However, when the firm-level controls are excluded, we
find a positive and significant effect of environmental auditing on facility compliance.
Section 6 discusses the implications of our results. In particular, we suggest that
researchers use caution in assuming that firm-level participation in a program applies
equally to all facilities owned by that firm, as such an assumption may induce systematic
measurement error that could affect the results of their analyses and alter policy-relevant
conclusions.

2.

The environmental performance effects of voluntary program participation:
evidence from environmental auditing and the 33/50 program
Voluntary environmental initiatives can range from a government-sponsored

voluntary program (e.g., Energy Star) to programs sponsored by trade associations (e.g.,
the American Chemistry Council’s Responsible Care Program) to unilateral initiatives
undertaken by the regulated entity without direct government involvement. Regardless of
type, most voluntary programs provide explicit or implicit incentives for participation and
involve actions that go beyond what is required by various environmental statutes. As
discussed in Lyon and Maxwell [5], incentives for participation mainly fall into three
categories: participation may make the regulated entity more attractive to consumers and
investors, participation may shape current and future regulatory decisions by reducing
enforcement effort or preempting future regulations, and participation may result in
increased productivity or efficiency at the regulated entity.

5

Environmental auditing is one example of a voluntary environmental program.
An environmental audit is “...a systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by
regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental
requirements” and EPA has long suggested environmental auditing programs as a way for
regulated firms to improve their environmental compliance as well as environmental
performance more generally [6]. 4 EPA’s Audit Policy also provides explicit incentives
for firms to voluntarily adopt environmental auditing, as firms that choose to report and
correct violations discovered during the course of a voluntary environmental audit are
eligible for significant penalty reductions. 5 Many states also have their own audit policies
that actively encourage environmental auditing by granting statutory privilege for
environmental audit reports and/or immunity from penalties for violations discovered
(and corrected and disclosed) during the course of an audit. 6
EPA has embraced environmental auditing because, at least in theory, such audits
provide a mechanism to improve a regulated entity’s compliance with environmental
regulations. 7 Survey and anecdotal evidence suggests positive impacts of auditing on
environmental performance [16, 17]. Additionally, three previous empirical studies
4

50 FR 46504, Section II.A. The academic literature on environmental regulation and compliance (as well
as that on compliance more generally) sometimes uses the term audit more generally to mean any periodic
inspection or review of an entity’s compliance status. To distinguish reviews initiated by regulators from
those initiated by regulated entities and to be consistent with EPA’s terminology, we use the term “audit” to
refer to reviews voluntarily undertaken by the regulated entity and “inspection” to refer to reviews initiated
by regulators (and thus involuntary from the perspective of the regulated party).
5
Pfaff and Sanchirico [7], Short and Toffel [8], and Stafford [9] examine various aspects of EPA’s Audit
Policy.
6
Forty one states currently have some sort of environmental audit program. See Stafford [10, 11] and
Khanna and Widyawati [12] for further discussion of these state policies.
7
Most theoretical models of environmental auditing focus on the informational aspect of auditing (see, for
example, Mishra et al. [13], Pfaff and Sanchirico [14], Friesen [15]). The theoretical models generally
assume that environmental performance or compliance with environmental regulations includes a stochastic
element. As a result, regulated entities cannot fully observe their levels of emissions or compliance status
ex ante. By conducting an environmental audit, a regulated entity learns its true level of environmental
performance and, where such performance is below the entity’s optimal level, can undertake corrective
actions.

6

explore the impact of environmental auditing on compliance. Khanna and Widyawati
[12] find higher contemporaneous compliance with Clean Air Act (CAA) regulations
among facilities whose S&P 500 corporate parent indicates the presence of an
environmental auditing program. Evans, Liu and Stafford [18] report no significant
influence of auditing on long-term facility compliance with the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) among a sample of hazardous waste generators in Michigan.
Earnhart and Harrington [19] find that more frequent auditing of a facility improves
compliance with Clean Water Act (CWA) effluent limits for total suspended solids (TSS)
but not biological oxygen demand (BOD). 8
Given their similar focus, the results of Khanna and Widyawati and Evans, Liu,
and Stafford at first glance appear contradictory. Khanna and Widyawati find that
environmental auditing improves compliance while Evans, Liu and Stafford find the
opposite. However, upon closer consideration, the results of these two previous studies
are not necessarily at odds because there are a number of differences between the
analyses could individually or collectively drive the disparate findings. The studies focus
on different environmental media (i.e., air versus hazardous waste) and different time
frames (i.e., contemporaneous versus long-term). The samples are distinct with Khanna
and Widyawti’s sample consisting of a set of facilities whose S&P 500 parent companies
responded to the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC) survey on
environmental management practices survey and Evans et al.’s sample including large
and small hazardous waste generators in Michigan. Lastly, and for our purposes

8

An important feature of their study is its focus on a group of facilities that regularly conduct self-audits
(i.e., chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES)). Thus, the results of their study cannot speak to whether the adoption of an audit
program improves compliance compared to non-adoption.

7

potentially most important, the analyses measure environmental auditing at different
levels of the firm’s decision-making structure. Khanna and Widyawati observe a firmlevel auditing measure, the presence or absence of an auditing program as indicated by
the parent company, and assume uniform application of the auditing program to all
facilities owned by the firm. 9 That is, Khanna and Widyawati assume the firm adopts a
standardized auditing policy (i.e., the firm either audits no facilities or audits all facilities
in its portfolio). In contrast, Evans et al. observe auditing outcomes at the facility-level
and are therefore not obliged to assume standardization.
Similar issues about the use of firm-level vs. facility-level participation measures
have arisen in the context of another voluntary environmental program, the governmentsponsored 33/50 program. The 33/50 program was developed by the EPA in the early
nineties and set a goal of reducing aggregate emissions of 17 chemicals by 33% in 1992
and by 50% in 1995, relative to the participant’s 1988 baseline. While regulated firms
were invited to join the 33/50 program, not all facilities owned by such firms were active
participants in the program. 10 The 33/50 program is perhaps the most widely studied of
all voluntary environmental programs, although to date there remains little consensus on
the effect of participation in the 33/50 program on toxic emissions. Of course, the
empirical studies that examine this question differ along multiple dimensions that could
explain the discrepancy in results. Like the studies of environmental auditing, two
important dimensions are the level at which the participation outcome is measured and
the level at which environmental performance is measured.

9

If the parent company does not indicate the presence of an auditing program, then Khanna and Widyawati
assume no facilities owned by the parent company conduct an environmental audit.
10
See Bi and Khanna [20] and Vidovic and Khanna [21] for a more thorough discussion of facility vs. firm
participation.

8

Three studies, Khanna and Damon [22], Vidovic and Khanna [23], and Innes and
Sam [24], use a firm-level measure of program participation provided by EPA (whether
or not at least one facility committed to the program) as well as a firm-level measure of
environmental performance (calculated by aggregating some measure of emissions across
all facilities owned by a participating firm). Khanna and Damon and Innes and Sam find
a reduction in emissions as a result of program participation while Vidovic and Khanna
do not. In contrast, Gamper-Rabindran [25] conducts a facility-level analysis of
emissions using EPA’s measure of firm-level participation and finds that participation
decreases emissions only in a few select industries. The two most recent contributions to
this literature, Bi and Khanna [20] and Vidovic and Khanna [21], use both a facility-level
measure of 33/50 participation and a facility-level measure of performance. Interestingly,
the facility-level participation data suggest that just over one-fifth of the facilities owned
by 33/50 firms (i.e., parent company participants in 33/50) actually participated in the
program and furthermore, most 33/50 firms had only a few participating facilities [20].
However, even with data at similar measurement levels, Bi and Khanna (2012) find a
significant negative effect of facility participation on emissions of 33/50 chemicals while
Vidovic and Khanna [21], looking at a more restrictive sample, find no significant effect
of facility participation on facility emissions.

3

Conceptual Model
In this section we present a model of voluntary program adoption within a multi-

facility firm. A multi-facility firm may adopt various decision-making structures. Under a
centralized structure, a single location (e.g., headquarters) makes and implements the
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program adoption decision for all facilities. Under a decentralized structure, each facility
independently chooses whether to adopt the voluntary program. A structure in between
these two extremes might have one facility make adoption decisions for itself and for
other nearby facilities (e.g., the firm may house an environmental compliance department
in one facility for each region in which the firm operates). Regardless of the adopted
structure, the decision-making may result in a standardized outcome in which either all
facilities adopt or no facilities adopt. In this case, we say that the firm has a standardized
adoption policy. Alternatively, adoption outcomes may be characterized by adoption at
some facilities and not at others; we refer to this case as a heterogeneous adoption policy.
Our model draws on the literature on the centralization-decentralization decision
for multi-unit firms, itself a subset of the literature on organizational structure. Papers in
this literature consider different incentives for a firm to centralize or decentralize its
decision-making structure. For example, in Sah and Stiglitz [26] the optimal
organizational structure depends on the relative cost of Type I and Type II errors about
the benefits of various projects. In Van Zandt [27] the optimal structure depends on the
delay associated with distributing information across units relative to the benefits from
increased information. Chang and Harrington [28] focus on the level of positive
spillovers and mutual learning across units as well as the interplay between incentives of
local managers to maximize unit profit and headquarters managers to maximize firm
profit. The model we develop is most like the model presented in Hunnicutt [29].
Hunnicutt examines the decision-making process of a multi-plant firm that must weigh
the relative benefits of making production decisions at a single location and shipping
bundles to various outlets relative to the benefit of having each outlet make its own
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production decision. Under centralization, the firm achieves economies of scale but can
make mistakes about the optimal amount of product for each outlet. Under decentralized
production, mistakes are minimized but economies of scale are not achieved. Importantly,
Hunnicutt also examines the conditions under which the firm finds it optimal to
standardize the amount of product for each outlet.
Our primary interest lies in understanding when a firm is likely to adopt
standardized policy with respect to adoption of a voluntary program rather than a
heterogenous policy. Our focus on the standardization decision is in part due to the fact
that the underlying decision-making structure of the firm (e.g., centralized, decentralized)
remains unobservable, while the adoption of a standardized or heterogeneous policy is
observable (with appropriate data). Thus we develop a model of the decision to
standardize for a multi-facility firm that owns N total facilities of 𝑀 ≥ 1 different types.

Let 𝛾𝑚 denote the number of type-m facilities owned by the firm such that ∑𝑀
𝑚=1 𝛾𝑚 = 𝑁.
We refer to the firm as single-type if 𝑀 = 1, or multiple-type if 𝑀 > 1. Following

Hunnicutt, we examine the decision to standardize under two organizational structures,
centralization and decentralization. We assume that under centralization, the firm incurs
lower adoption costs but observes the true benefit of adoption at each facility type with
noise. Under decentralization, the firm observes the true benefit of adoption at each of its
facilities but faces higher adoption costs.
Denote the benefit of adoption at a type-m facility as 𝑏𝑚 . For 𝑀 > 1, we assume

𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑀 ≥ 0 so that the benefits of adoption at a type-1 facility are highest.

For a given 𝑀, the larger is the difference between adoption at a type-1 facility (i.e., the

highest benefit) and a type-M facility (i.e., the lowest benefit), the more diverse are the 𝑀
11

facility types owned by the firm. We use this difference, 𝑏1 − 𝑏𝑀 , as a measure of the
degree of heterogeneity among the facilities in a firm’s portfolio.

Under decentralization, each facility observes its own benefit of adoption. The
cost of adoption at a facility under decentralization is constant and equal to 𝑐. Under

centralization, the single-type firm observes the true benefit of adoption at each of its
facilities. 11 In contrast, the multiple-type centralized firm lacks full information about

each facility’s operations due to agency problems. As a result, the multi-facility firm fails
𝐻
to observe the true benefit of adoption at each facility type, which is either high (𝑏𝑚
) or

𝐿
𝐻
𝐿
) with 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝑏𝑚
for each facility type m. The multiple-type centralized firm has
low (𝑏𝑚

𝐻
prior probability 𝜆𝑚 that 𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
for facility type m and knows the number of facilities

of each type. The firm observes a signal of the benefit of adoption at each facility type

(i.e., the same signal for all facilities of a given type). 12 Let 𝑧𝑚 denote the signal the firm

𝐻
𝐿
receives for a type-m facility where 𝑧𝑚 equals 𝑏𝑚
or 𝑏𝑚
according to the following

probability distributions:

𝐻 |𝑏
𝐻
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) = 𝑝𝑚

𝐿 |𝑏
𝐻
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) = 1 − 𝑝𝑚
𝐻 |𝑏
𝐿
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) = 𝑞𝑚

𝐿 |𝑏
𝐿
𝑃(𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) = 1 − 𝑞𝑚 .
11

This assumption is consistent with a single facility making decisions for all facilities. This “headquarters
facility” might, for example, house the single environmental compliance department for the firm. In this
case, even in the presence of agency problems arising through interactions with the headquarters facility
and other facilities, the headquarters facility still has full information about its own benefit of adoption.
Since facilities are identical, the benefit of adoption at the headquarters facility is equal to the benefit of
adoption at any other facility.
12
For example, the centralized firm may rely on reports provided by facility managers based on
information the managers compile from various divisions within their facilities. The organizational
structure of the firm can create incentives for misreporting at various levels. For example, Evans et al. [30]
show that compensation determined by a rank-order tournament may encourage such malfeasance on the
part of managers.
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where 𝑝𝑚 > 𝑞𝑚 .

The firm benefits from centralization through a lower unit cost of adoption. The

cost of adoption at a facility under centralization is equal to 𝛼𝛼 with 0 < 𝛼 < 1. The

lower adoption cost under centralization may stem from the elimination of duplicated
activities or from returns to specialization (e.g., using a single team of trained
environmental compliance staff is less costly than providing such specialized training to
staff onsite at each facility).

3.1

The single-type firm’s decision
We first consider the adoption decision of a single-type firm (i.e., 𝑀 = 1). Let 𝑏

denote the benefit to the single-type firm of adoption at one of its facilities. The singletype firm, under centralization or decentralization, will either adopt the program at all
facilities or adopt for no facilities. That is, it chooses a standardized adoption policy.

Under centralization, if the marginal benefit of adoption at a facility, 𝑏, exceeds

the marginal cost of adoption, 𝛼𝛼, then the single-type firm maximizes its net benefits by
adopting the program at all N facilities. Otherwise, the centralized single-type firm does

not adopt the program at any facility. Under centralization, the net benefits of program
adoption at all N facilities for the single-type firm are given by
𝑁𝑁𝑐1 (𝑀 = 1) = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼.

The subscript denotes the firm structure, c for centralized and d for decentralized, while
the superscript indicates the single-type firm.
Under decentralization, each facility will adopt the program provided 𝑏 > 𝑐. The

net benefits to the decentralized single-type firm of adoption at all facilities is then
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𝑁𝑁𝑑1 (𝑀 = 1) = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐.

Notice that the total benefit of adoption at all facilities is the same under both structures.
Given this and since 𝛼 < 1, the net benefits of adoption are higher under centralization
for the single-type firm (i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝑐1 (𝑀 = 1) > 𝑁𝑁𝑑1 (𝑀 = 1)). Thus, a firm that owns
identical facilities chooses a centralized structure and follows the straightforward

adoption decision rule discussed above. Intuitively, the single-type firm enjoys lower
costs of adoption under centralization without the associated risk of misestimating the
benefits of adoption. For the single-type firm, the decision to adopt a program for all
facilities versus no facilities is driven entirely by the benefits and costs of adoption under
centralization.

3.2

The mutiple-type firm’s decision
Now consider a firm that owns 𝑀 > 1 types of facilities (i.e., a multiple-type

firm). Under decentralization, the multiple-type firm adopts the program at all facilities
only if the benefit of adoption a type-M facility exceeds the cost, 𝑏𝑀 ≥ 𝑐. Recall that the

type-M facility has the lowest benefit of adoption so the decentralized multiple-type firm
finds adoption at all facility types optimal only if the net benefits of adoption at a type-M
facility are positive. The decentralized firm does not adopt the program at any facility if
the cost of adoption exceeds the benefit of adoption at a type-1 facility (i.e., the highest
benefit facility), 𝑐 > 𝑏1. If 𝑏1 ≥ 𝑐 > 𝑏𝑀 , then the multiple-type firm prefers a

heterogeneous adoption policy under decentralization. In other words, for standardization
to be optimal for the multiple-type firm under decentralization, either 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ >

𝑏𝑀 ≥ 𝑐 or 𝑐 > 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑀 must hold. This implies that as the difference in
14

benefits to adoption at the highest and lowest benefit facility types grows, the range of
adoption costs for which a multiple-type firm finds standardization optimal under
decentralization gets smaller. Thus, under decentralization, multi-facility firms whose
portfolios of facilities exhibit higher degrees of heterogeneity are ceteris paribus less
likely to employ standardized adoption policies.
A more concrete two-firm example where the voluntary program in question is
environmental auditing illustrates this result. Assume decentralized Firms A and B each
own 100 total facilities of ten different types. Each firm owns 10 facilities of each type so
that 𝛾𝑚 = 10 for 𝑚 = 1, … ,10. For firm A, a type-1 facility has a benefit of auditing

equal to 10 and a type-10 facility has an auditing benefit of 1. The benefits of auditing for
facility types 2 through 9 take integer values between 9 and 2 for firm A. For firm B, a
type-1 facility has a benefit of auditing equal to 6 and a type-10 facility has an auditing
benefit of 5. The benefits of auditing for facility types 2 through 9 take equally
distributed values between 6 and 5. Given these assumptions, the mean benefit of
auditing a facility is 5.5 for both firms but the difference between auditing the highest
benefit facility and the lowest benefit facility (i.e., 𝑏1 − 𝑏𝑀 ) is only 1 for Firm B and is 9

for Firm A. That is, Firm B exhibits a lower degree of heterogeneity than Firm A. Firm B
finds standardization optimal when the cost of auditing is less than 5 or greater than 6
whereas Firm A chooses to standardize only when the auditing cost is below 1 or above
10. Thus, the range of auditing costs for which Firm A, the firm with a higher degree of
heterogeneity, finds standardization optimal is less than the range of costs for which Firm
B chooses a standardized auditing policy.

15

Now consider the decision facing the multiple-type firm under centralization. For
𝐻
𝐿
a multiple-type firm in which (i) 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 for all facility types 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, or (ii)
𝐻
𝐿
𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝑏𝑚
for all facility types, a standardized adoption policy is optimal. If (i)

holds, then the firm adopts the program at all facilities. If (ii) holds, then the firm forgoes
adoption at all facilities. The lack of full information has no impact on such a firm’s
adoption decisions.
The more interesting case is a firm that owns some facility types for which the

𝐻
𝐿
benefits of adoption satisfy 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚
(i.e., adoption is optimal for the “high” m-

type but not for the “low” m-type). In what follows, we restrict attention to this case. The
𝐻
𝐿
centralized firm bases its adoption decision for facility types with 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚
on the

expected benefits of adoption conditional on the signal the firm receives. The ranking of
facility types from highest to lowest based on the true benefits of adoption need not
coincide with the ranking of facility types from highest to lowest based on the conditional
expected benefits of adoption. The conditional expected benefit of adoption at a type-m
facility depends on the posterior probability distribution given by:
𝐻 |𝑧
𝐻
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) =
𝐿 |𝑧
𝐻
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) =
𝐻 |𝑧
𝐿
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) =
𝐿 |𝑧
𝐿
𝑃(𝑏𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚 ) =

𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚
𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )

(1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚
(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 ) + (1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚

(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
.
(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 ) + (1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚

𝐻
Conditional on observing the signal 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
, the expected benefit of adoption at a type-

m facility is given in expression (1):

16

𝐻)
𝐻
𝐸(𝑏𝑚 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
= 𝑏𝑚

𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚
𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
𝐿
+ 𝑏𝑚
. (1)
𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
𝑝𝑚 𝜆𝑚 + 𝑞𝑚 (1 − 𝜆𝑚 )

𝐿
If instead the centralized firm observes 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
, then the conditional expected benefit of

adoption at a type-m facility equals:

𝐿)
𝐻
𝐸(𝑏𝑚 |𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚
= 𝑏𝑚
𝐿
+𝑏𝑚

(1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚
(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 ) + (1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚

(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 )
.
(1 − 𝑞𝑚 )(1 − 𝜆𝑚 ) + (1 − 𝑝𝑚 )𝜆𝑚

(2)

The centralized multiple-type firm adopts the program at all type-m facilities if
𝐿
𝐻
, 𝑏𝑚
. Otherwise, the firm forgoes adoption at all type-m
𝐸(𝑏𝑚 |𝑧𝑚 ) ≥ 𝛼𝛼 where 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑏𝑚

facilities.

The intuition for establishing the conditions under which the centralized firm
chooses a standardized adoption policy are similar to that for the decentralized firm with
one important difference. The decentralized firm bases its adoption decision on the
known benefits of adoption whereas the centralized firm uses the conditional expected
benefits of adoption. Since the ranking of facility types based on the true benefits of
adoption may differ from the ranking based on the conditional expected benefits of
adoption, the set of facilities adopting the program under centralization may differ from
those that adopt under decentralization.
The centralized firm adopts the program at all facilities if it owns no facility types
𝐻
𝐿
𝐻
𝐿
≥ 𝑏𝑚
and, among those facilities with 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚
, the conditional
such that 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚

expected benefit of adoption at the facility type with the lowest conditional expected

benefit exceeds the adoption cost. The centralized firm adopts the program at no facilities
𝐻
𝐿
if it owns no facility types such that 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 and, among those facilities with

𝐻
𝐿
𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚
, if the conditional expected benefit of adoption at the facility type with
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the highest conditional expected benefit is less than the cost of adoption. Finally, if
neither of these holds, then the centralized firm opts for a heterogeneous adoption
policy. 13 This implies that as the difference in conditional expected benefits of adoption
at the facility type with the highest conditional expected benefit and at the facility type
with the lowest conditional expected benefit grows, the range of adoption costs for which
a multiple-type centralized firm finds standardization optimal gets smaller. Since the
𝐿
𝐻
conditional expected benefit for facility type m is increasing in 𝑏𝑚
and 𝑏𝑚
, the

centralized multi-facility firm whose portfolio of facilities exhibits a higher degree of
heterogeneity is ceteris paribus less likely to adopt a standardized adoption policy.
Overall, the model generates two primary hypotheses with respect to firm
characteristics and the likelihood that a firm will employ a standardized adoption policy.
First, the model implies that multi-facility firms are less likely to employ a standardized
adoption policy if their facilities exhibit substantial heterogeneity. Second, a standardized
adoption policy is more likely among multi-facility firms for which the costs of adoption
are either prohibitively high or negligible, relative to the benefits of adoption. These
intuitive results hold whether the firm has adopted a centralized or decentralized decision
making structure.

4.

Firm-level analysis of standardization in auditing outcomes
Testing the hypotheses about standardization that arise from our conceptual model

requires facility-level data on voluntary program adoption. For our analysis, we consider
adoption of an environmental audit program. In general, national data on environmental
𝐻
𝐿
As mentioned above, standardization is also optimal when (i) 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝑏𝑚
≥ 𝛼𝛼 for all facility types
𝐻
𝐿
𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, or (ii) 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑏𝑚 ≥ 𝑏𝑚 for all facility types.
13
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auditing are difficult to obtain due in part to the fact that EPA does not require regulated
entities to indicate the presence of audit programs. Fortunately, Michigan, like many
other states, has its own environmental auditing program. Under the provisions of
Michigan’s audit policy, which began in 1997, audit documents are privileged and
voluntary disclosures are eligible for immunity from penalties. 14 One rather unique
feature of Michigan’s audit policy is that regulated entities must provide advance notice
of an audit to receive penalty immunity. 15 Specifically, the facility must file an “intent-toaudit” notice that identifies the facility at which the audit will be conducted, indicates the
time frame for the audit, and states the general scope of the audit. 16
We obtained a list of the intent-to-audit notices filed with the DEQ between 1998
and 2003. The data include the company and facility name, a mailing address, and the
date the notice was filed. We used this information to match each facility to EPA’s
Facility Registry System (FRS) to identify the federal facility identification number and
to determine the media programs under which the facility is regulated. Our empirical
analysis focuses on facilities regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in Michigan and
the firms that own these facilities. We obtained data on facility characteristics from
EPA’s Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) Facility Subsystem (or AFS)
database. 17 Using DUNS numbers (when available) and owner names from the FRS,

14

In addition to Michigan, 17 other states provide audit privilege and immunity.
To our knowledge the only other state that requires prior notification is Texas.
16
While it is possible that a facility might conduct an environmental audit without first notifying the DEQ,
Michigan provides strong incentives for facilities to file intent-to-audit notices; a primary benefit of
auditing is the potential for penalty mitigation and this benefit is available only to auditing facilities that
submit the required intent-to-audit notice. Additionally, since Michigan grants legal privilege to all
environmental auditing documents, entities should not be reluctant to disclose environmental audits. See
Evans et al. [18] for further discussion of these data.
17
The AFS database was downloaded from EPA’s Envirofacts System in August 2007. AFS also lists 3
“portable sources” located in Michigan, but we excluded them from this analysis since they do not have a
fixed facility location.
15
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along with company name from the AFS, we matched CAA-regulated facilities in
Michigan that were owned by the same firm. 18 In order to empirically explore the role of
heterogeneity, we restrict attention to multi-facility firms, of which we have 171
represented in our data. These 171 firms own a total of 730 facilities.
Our first empirical analysis explores the factors that lead a firm to choose a
standardized adoption policy. Thus the dependent variable in the analysis is
Standardization, which equals one if either all facilities owned by a firm audit or if none
of the facilities owned by the firm audit. Otherwise, Standardization equals zero. We
observe standardization for 155 firms (about 90%), which accounts for 590 facilities
(81%). For the remaining 10 percent of firms, we observe heterogeneous auditing among
their 140 facilities. Note that since our data contain facilities located in a single state, the
degree of standardization we observe is likely to be higher than if our dataset included
facilities located in several states. Since policies on audit privilege and audit immunity
vary by state, firms that operate in multiple states may be more likely to adopt a
standardized audit policy at their facilities within a given state (versus adopting a
standardized policy at all of their facilities).
We estimate a simple probit regression for Standardization. The first testable
implication of our conceptual model is that higher levels of heterogeneity among a firm’s
facilities will decrease the likelihood that the firm uses a standardized adoption policy.
Thus, we need to operationalize the concept of heterogeneity from our theoretical model.
In the model heterogeneity is represented as the difference in the benefits of auditing the
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As a first pass, we electronically matched facilities owned by the same firm using DUNS numbers and
company names but since the owner and company name fields do not have standardized formats (e.g., no
standard abbreviations or punctuation rules), we made many of the matches manually for facilities with
missing DUNS numbers.
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facilities that have the highest benefit from auditing and the facilities that have the
lowest. Because we don’t observe the benefits of auditing different facility types, our
empirical measures of heterogeneity rely on observable facility characteristics that may
proxy for underlying differences in the benefits of auditing different facilities. 19 We
create three firm-level measures of heterogeneity. Each measure captures a different
dimension of heterogeneity and takes a value between zero and one where zero denotes a
homogeneous portfolio of firms with respect to that characteristic. 20 The first measure,
Industry heterogeneity, focuses on the nature of production at each facility as measured
by the up to three 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes associated with
the facility. If the sequence of 4-digit SIC codes is identical for all facilities in the firm’s
portfolio, then Industry heterogeneity equals zero. If each facility in the firm’s portfolio
has a unique sequence of 4-digit SIC codes, then Industry heterogeneity is equal to one. 21
If the firm’s portfolio contains a mix of unique and repeated sequences of SIC codes
among its facilities, then Industry heterogeneity takes some value between zero and one.
In general, a higher value (closer to one) of Industry heterogeneity indicates more
diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of their production activities.
Our second measure, Regulatory heterogeneity, examines the nature of the
regulatory environment at the facilities owned by a firm. While our analysis only includes
facilities regulated under the CAA, our dataset contains information on other
environmental programs to which the facility is subject. We create five indicator
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In our theoretical model, we chose to model heterogeneity in benefits while assuming constant costs
across facilities. However, similar insights arise in a model with heterogeneity in costs and constant
benefits.
20
See the appendix for a more detailed description of these measures.
21
Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use an alternative industry heterogeneity measure created
with the sequence of 2-digit SIC codes.
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variables from this information. The first two variables indicate that the facility is subject
to the provisions of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) or the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), respectively. The remaining variables indicate that the
facility shows up in an EPA database, the Permit Compliance System (PCS), the
Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS), or the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), respectively.
PCS and ICIS designate facilities that are registered with EPA’s federal enforcement and
compliance and that hold National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. A
facility in CERCLIS is on (or being considered for) Superfund’s National Priorities
List. Regulatory heterogeneity measures the diversity among facilities in terms of the
sequence of these five indicator variables. If the sequence of these five indicator variables
is the same for all facilities in the firm’s portfolio (i.e., the facilities face the same
environmental regulatory environment), then Regulatory heterogeneity equals zero. A
value closer to one indicates more diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of their
regulatory exposure.
Our final measure, Size heterogeneity, assesses the degree of heterogeneity in
terms of the size of the facilities owned by the firm, as measured by the number of
employees at the facilities. 22 To construct this measure, we first create a categorical
variable to characterize the number of employees at the facility as less than or equal to
10, greater than 10 but less than or equal to 100, greater than 100 but less than or equal to
500, or greater than 500. Size heterogeneity equals zero if all facilities in the firm’s
22

The AFS provides a variable described as the number of employees at the facility. However, this
variable takes a value of zero for a large fraction of facilities. If we exclude our size heterogeneity measure
from the firm-level analysis below, our results with respect to the other included variables are unchanged.
Alternatively, if we assume these zeros are in fact missing values, while our sample size decreases, our
results are qualitatively similar.
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portfolio have the same value for this categorical variable and one if each facility in the
firm’s portfolio has a unique value for this categorical variable. Thus, values of Size
heterogeneity closer to one indicate more diversity among the firm’s facilities in terms of
facility size. If the degree of heterogeneity discourages adoption of standardized auditing
policies, then we expect negative and significant coefficients on these three heterogeneity
measures in our probit models.
Our final measure of heterogeneity is intended to capture other sources of
unobserved heterogeneity. We argue that a firm whose portfolio includes a larger number
of facilities is more likely to exhibit heterogeneity among its facilities than a firm owning
a small number of facilities. We acknowledge that # facilities is a rough proxy since the
number of facilities owned by a firm may also affect the firm’s incentives for
standardization through other channels (e.g., by affecting the benefits or costs of
auditing). This means that our empirical results with respect to this variable will not
allow us to confirm or refute our theoretical prediction regarding heterogeneity.
Recall that our model also predicts that the costs and benefits of auditing affect
incentives to standardize. In particular, sufficiently high or low benefits relative to the
costs of auditing may make auditing all firms or no firms optimal (i.e., may encourage
standardization). Unfortunately, the benefits and costs of auditing are unobservable to
outsiders. Therefore, to proxy for the relative benefits and costs of auditing, we use a
dummy variable, Public, that equals one if the firm is publicly traded and zero otherwise.
We argue that publicly traded firms face pressure from consumers and investors to
comply with environmental regulations that privately held firms do not feel. This is
consistent with Henriques and Sadorsky’s [31] finding that firms are more likely to
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formulate an environmental plan if they face pressure on environmental issues from
shareholders. Similarly, Earnhart and Harrington [19] argue that publicly traded firms
may have stronger incentives to comply with environmental regulations because they
enjoy greater access to external financing, which may reduce costs, and/or face greater
pressure from investors for good environmental performance, which may increase
benefits. However, since standardization equals one when the firm audits all firms or
audits no firms, our model does not offer a clear prediction on the expected sign of the
estimated coefficient on Public in our probit model.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics as well as the results of our probit analysis.
The first column reports means and standard deviations. While the sample average for
Industry heterogeneity is 0.67, 35 firms (about 20%) are homogenous along this
dimension and 98 firms (about 57%) have a value of Industry heterogeneity equal to one.
52 firms are homogeneous with respect to regulatory heterogeneity and 66 firms have the
maximum value of regulatory heterogeneity. With respect to size, 71 firms are
homogeneous and 50 firms are maximally heterogeneous. Thirty percent of the firms in
our sample are publicly traded and the average firm has just over four facilities in its
Michigan CAA portfolio (although the median number of facilities is two).
The third column in Table 1 reports estimated coefficients and robust standard
errors from our probit model while the forth column reports conditional marginal effects
and standard errors for the probit obtained using the Delta method. The negative and
significant coefficients on Industry heterogeneity and Regulatory heterogeneity are
consistent with the model’s prediction that heterogeneity should reduce the likelihood of
standardization at a multi-facility firm. The coefficient on Size heterogeneity is also
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negative, as expected, but not significantly different from zero. The conditional marginal
effect for Industry heterogeneity suggests that the most heterogeneous firm (i.e., Industry
heterogeneity=1) is 2.6 percentage points less likely to standardize than the homogeneous
firm (p-value=0.058). In terms of regulatory heterogeneity, the most heterogeneous firm
is 3.6 percentage points less likely to standardize than the firm with Regulatory
heterogeneity equal to zero (p-value=0.014). Standardization is also less likely among
publicly traded firms; publicly traded firms are 5 percentage points less likely to
standardize than privately held firms. If publicly held firms are likely to have
significantly high benefits (perhaps because they face investor pressure), then we may
expect them to be more likely to audit all firms relative to adopting a heterogeneous
auditing policy. However, we would simultaneously expect them to be less likely to audit
no facilities relative to auditing some but not all facilities. The negative and significant
coefficient on Public is consistent with the latter effect dominating. Lastly, the
probability of standardization decreases with the number of facilities owned by the firm
although the estimated conditional marginal effect is small.
To provide some additional evidence that the variables we include in our probit
model are reasonable proxies for the underlying measures from our model, we estimate a
fractional logit model [32], in which the dependent variable is the fraction of its facilities
the firm audits. We include the same independent variables as in our standardization
probit. Results of the fractional logit model are reported in the final column of Table 1.
Recall that our model suggests that the firm’s decision of which facility types to audit
given a heterogeneous auditing policy is driven exclusively by the benefits (or expected
benefits) and the costs of auditing while heterogeneity affects whether a firm will use a
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standardized policy. Thus, our theory does not predict a relationship between
heterogeneity and the fraction of facilities that audit. As shown in the final column of
Table 1, we confirm no statistically significant effect of heterogeneity on the fraction of
facilities that audit. However, the positive and significant coefficient on Public indicates
that, relative to privately held firms, publicly traded firms audit a higher percentage of
their facilities, perhaps because the benefits of doing so are higher. The positive
coefficient on # facilities (p-value = 0.104) suggests that larger firms audit a higher
fraction of their facilities, perhaps due to lower auditing costs.
What are the implications of our firm-level analysis for empirical models of
environmental auditing? First, our results suggest that the measurement error introduced
by assigning the same auditing outcome to all facilities owned by a firm, as is necessary
with only a firm-level auditing outcome, is likely to be greater for firms whose facilities
are more diverse. To provide further evidence of this, we first explore the degree of
misalignment between our facility-level audit measure and two candidate firm-level audit
measures. Firm audit1 equals one if the firm owns at least one facility that submitted an
intent-to-audit notice and zero otherwise and Firm audit2 equals one if all of the facilities
owned by the firm submitted intent-to-audit notices and zero otherwise. 23 Specifically,
we ask: For how many facilities would we incorrectly assign an auditing outcome were
we to substitute facility-level audit data with a firm-level audit measure? For both
measures, the firm-level measure is different than the facility-level measure for about
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It remains possible that (1) a firm with Firm audit1 equal to zero audits at one of its facilities located
outside the state of Michigan or (2) a firm with Firm audit2 equal to one chooses not to audit at a facility
located in another state. Our two firm-level audit measures are defined based on the sample of facilities we
observe, which are all located in Michigan.
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10% of the 730 facilities owned by the firms in our analysis. 24 Table 2 report means and
standard deviations for our three heterogeneity measures by whether or not the facilityand firm-level audit measures are equal. If more heterogeneity is associated with more
measurement error as suggested by the theory, then we expect the mean heterogeneity to
be higher among observations in which the facility- and firm-level measures differ. The
table confirms this.
Ultimately we do not know whether either of these firm-level audit measures
would align with a firm-level auditing outcome obtained from a survey of firms, as used
in Khanna and Widyawati [12]. Regardless, this exercise reinforces the need for caution
in assuming complete standardization in auditing outcomes among facilities owned by
the same firm. Additionally, our findings hint at the potential importance of controlling
for firm characteristics that might influence the standardization decision in analyses of
any voluntary program, including environmental auditing. In the next section, we explore
the implications of this second insight in a facility-level analysis of the impact of
environmental auditing on compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA).

5.

A facility-level analysis of environmental auditing
Our facility-level analysis examines the factors that encourage environmental

auditing at a facility as well as the impact of auditing on the facility’s long term
compliance with the CAA. In particular, we examine the potential for the explicit
recognition of firms’ differential incentives for standardization in a facility-level
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The distributions of both Firm audit1 and Firm audit2 are significantly different from the facility-level
audit measure (both with p-value=0.00).
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empirical analysis of environmental auditing to lead to different conclusions regarding
the effectiveness of environmental auditing. To do so, we expand our dataset beyond the
multi-facility firms included in our analysis above to include stand-alone facilities. 25 We
extract additional facility characteristics, enforcement history, and current compliance
status from the AFS. We also linked the AFS database to EPA’s Enforcement and
Compliance History Online (ECHO) and Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis
(IDEA) databases to obtain additional enforcement and compliance measures.
We identify an audit at a facility if the facility submitted at least one intent-toaudit notice between 1998 and 2003. In this case, the variable Facility audit equals one
for the facility. Otherwise, we do not measure an audit at the facility and Facility audit
equals zero. Of the 2811 facilities included in our analysis, 111 (about 4%) submitted
intent-to-audit notices during the time frame we consider. 26
The CAA requires facilities to self-report their compliance status on an on-going
basis (i.e., each quarter). 27 We use these data to create a binary compliance variable,
Comply, which equals one if the facility is in compliance for each of the 12 quarters
between the second quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2007. 28 Comply equals zero if
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Note that due to missing data for some of the variables included in our facility-level analysis not all of
the 730 facilities whose parent companies are included in our firm-level analysis (Section 4) are present in
our facility-level analysis. 542 facilities whose firms are included in our firm-level analysis are present in
the sample used in our facility-level analysis.
26
The 4 percent audit rate is roughly consistent with Potoski and Prakash’s [33] estimate that
approximately 4 percent of “major” CAA-regulated facilities participate in the ISO14001 certification
program, a program which requires (among other things) adoption of an environmental auditing protocol.
27
The self-reported nature of the compliance data introduces the potential for bias. Existing evidence on
the accuracy of self-reported environmental compliance data is mixed. For example, deMarchi and
Hamilton [34] find reporting irregularities in self-reported data from the Toxics Release Inventory but these
data are not used by regulators for enforcement purposes. Analyses of self-reported compliance measures
that are used for enforcement purposes have been unable to reject the accuracy of these data [35, 36]. The
use of self-reported data for enforcement purposes provides strong incentives, such as criminal fines, to
encourage truthful reporting. The CAA self-reported data are used for enforcement.
28
Facilities are included in our analysis provided we observe compliance or non-compliance status for all
12 quarters. Facilities with missing compliance data during this time period are excluded from our
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the facility is out of compliance for at least one of these 12 quarters. In focusing on the
longer run impacts of auditing on compliance with the CAA, our analysis differs from
Khanna and Widyawati [12], who examine contemporaneous compliance effects.
A key concern in conducting an empirical analysis of the effect of audits on
compliance behavior is the potential for endogeneity. Specifically, because violations
discovered during the course of an audit are eligible for penalty mitigation (with the
possibility of a complete waiver of penalties), facilities that are concerned that they are
non-compliant may be more likely to implement an environmental auditing program. If
so, the audit decision would be correlated with factors that affect the compliance status of
the facility. However, while Khanna and Widyawati [12] could not reject the hypothesis
that their audit variable was endogenous, both Evans at al. [18] and Earnhart and
Harrington [19] found no evidence that their audit measure was endogenous
Even though the endogeneity of the auditing measure may be less of a concern in
this analysis given our emphasis on the longer run effects of auditing, to address the
possibility for endogeneity we follow Khanna and Widyawati by estimating a
simultaneous recursive bivariate probit model for the two latent binary dependent
variables, Facility audit and Comply. 29 We follow both Evans et al. [18] and Khanna and
Widyawati [12] in selecting facility- and county-level variables for inclusion in the audit
and compliance equations. We can broadly classify these variables as those related to the
facility’s characteristics, its inspection and compliance history, the stringency of the CAA

analysis. We re-estimated our models including all facilities with at least 2 quarters of data in this time
period and we obtain qualitatively similar results.
29
Maddala [37] derives the full information maximum likelihood estimator for this model, which we
estimate in Stata. According to Wilde [38], the model is identified with sufficient variation in the
independent variables. In our previous work, we used exclusion restrictions for identification.
Unfortunately we are unable to find valid exclusion restrictions for this application thus we adopt Khanna
and Widyawati’s identification strategy, which follows Wilde [38].
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regulations to which the facility is subject, its regulatory exposure under non-CAA
environmental programs, and county-level characteristics for the county in which the
facility is located. Table 3 provides variable descriptions and summary statistics. 30
We minimize our discussion of these facility- and county-level variables in order
to focus on the primary variables of interest for motivating our model of the firm’s
standardization decision. Based on our conceptual model, we expect the incentives for
standardization to vary systematically across firms. Our empirical analysis in section 4
confirms that the incentives for adopting a standardized auditing policy vary between
publicly traded and privately held firms, and by the degree of heterogeneity among the
facilities owned by the firm. Here, we explore the potential implications of recognizing
these differences in a facility-level analysis of environmental auditing by including two
relevant firm-level controls. The first variable, Multifacility, takes the value of one if the
firm owns more than one CAA-regulated facility in Michigan. The second variable,
Public, equals one if the firm that owns the facility (i.e., the facility’s parent company) is
publicly-traded and zero if it is privately held. Ten percent of facilities in our sample are
owned by publicly-traded firms while about 20 percent belong to a multi-facility firm.
Table 4 reports the results of our facility-level bivariate probit analysis. The
results of the audit and compliance equations are given in the left-hand and right-hand
panels, respectively. We report results for two specifications that differ in terms of
whether or not we include the two firm-level measures. Because Model I excludes these
firm-level controls, it is similar to those considered in previous analyses of environmental
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See Section 4 for a description of the regulatory program acronyms listed in Table 1.
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auditing. 31 Model II is identical to Model I other than the inclusion of Public and
Multifacility. 32 Model I is reported in the second and fourth columns while Model II is
reported in the third and fifth columns.
The results of Models I and II are broadly consistent with each other and with past
analyses with respect to the variables that measure facility- and county-level
characteristics. However, the inclusion of Public and Multifacility in Model II results in
two important differences between the results. First, the primary variable of interest in the
compliance equation, Audit, is positive and significant in Model I but insignificant (and
negative) in Model II. The former suggests that, controlling for the endogeneity of Audit,
auditing facilities are more likely to be in compliance. The latter result suggests no
significant impact of auditing on long-term compliance. Second, the estimate for ρ in
Model I is negative and significant, which suggests a correlation between the unobserved
factors that affect Audit and Comply. The estimate for ρ is insignificant in Model II.
Along both of these dimensions, Model I is consistent with the findings of Khanna and
Widyawati [12] while Model II aligns with Evans et al.’s [18] results. A Wald test
confirms that we are able to reject the null hypothesis that Public and Multifacility are
jointly equal to zero ( χ 2 (4 ) = 40.92 , p-value = 0.00). Thus, including these variables
significantly improves the fit of the model. If, as we argue, these variables are related to
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This analysis and that of Khanna and Widywati [12] examine the effects of auditing on compliance with
the CAA. However, the significant differences between the dataset we use here and the dataset used by
Khanna and Widyawati make replicating their specifications unfeasible. While our data are closer to the
sample used by Evans et al. [18] as both samples focus on facilities in Michigan, Evans et al.’s sample
includes manufacturing facilities regulated under RCRA while our sample restricts attention to CAAregulated facilities.
32
We get the qualitatively same results if we use all three firm-level heterogeneity measures in place of
Multifacility.
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the firm’s incentives for standardization, then our results suggest that such controls are
important in analyses of environmental auditing.

6.

Discussion
As external observers, researchers rely on data provided by regulated entities,

through surveys or through self-reports, or by regulators to measure participation in
voluntary programs and related outcomes. Often such data are only available at the firmlevel even though program adoption may happen at the facility-level. When researchers
use a firm-level measure of participation, they are making an assumption, which often
goes unstated, regarding the nature of decision-making within the regulated entity. In
particular they are assuming that the firm has a standardized adoption policy. However,
our theoretical model shows that it may not be optimal for a firm to adopt a standardized
policy. We find that the level of heterogeneity among a firm’s facilities is inversely
related to the likelihood that a standardized policy is optimal. However, at multi-facility
firms with relatively high or low benefits from adoption, a firm is more likely to adopt a
standardized policy.
Because our theoretical analysis suggests that assigning the same auditing
outcome for all facilities owned by the same firm (i.e., assuming standardization) is more
problematic for certain firms (e.g., those whose facilities exhibit more heterogeneity), we
examine the implications for the model using the adoption of a voluntary environmental
audit program as a case study. Using a dataset of CAA-regulated firms in Michigan, we
analyze the decision to standardize the adoption of environmental audits at the firm’s
regulated facilities in Michigan. We find that our measures of firm heterogeneity and
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proxies for the relative benefits from auditing do have statistically significant impacts on
the standardization decision and that those effects are consistent with the theory.
Next we examine whether accounting for those firm-level factors that influence
the standardization decision affects the results of an empirical analysis of the effect of
environmental auditing on facility compliance. Using a facility-level data set on both
environmental audit adoption and facility compliance with the CAA, we find that the
estimated impact of auditing on compliance depends on whether or not we include
controls for firm incentives to adopt a standardized auditing policy. When such controls
are excluded, our empirical results suggest a positive impact of auditing on long-run
compliance with the CAA. This effect disappears once these controls are added. Of
course, our controls are not perfect measures of firm incentives for standardization.
However, as in our dataset, many datasets are likely to contain a handful of observable
firm characteristics that may be related to this decision and can therefore be used as
proxies.
While our analysis examines the issue of standardization within the context of
environmental auditing, the decision to adopt an environmental auditing program shares
many aspects with the decision to participate in other voluntary environmental programs.
Thus, we believe that the lessons from our analysis have relevance for empirical analyses
of the impact on environmental performance of participation in other voluntary
environmental programs. For example, the various empirical analyses of EPA’s 33/50
program reach different conclusions regarding the effectiveness of participation in
improving environmental performance. While these studies vary across a number of
dimensions, one key dimension is whether participation is measured at the firm- or
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facility-level. Interestingly, neither of the two studies that examine the effect of facilitylevel participation on facility-level compliance [20, 21] include firm-level controls.
While three of the four studies that use a firm-level measure of adoption (and assume that
participation is standardized) include the number of facilities owned by the firm into their
analyses, none of them include measures of heterogeneity or the relative benefit of the
program. We believe that including more firm-level controls might help to reconcile
some of the mixed results in this literature.
To help policy makers effectively assess the extent to which participation in
voluntary programs can substitute for more traditional compliance and enforcement
mechanisms, it is important to conduct careful studies of such programs. Given the
findings of our study, we recommend that future analyses of voluntary environmental
program include facility-level participation measures as well as firm-level controls, when
available. If facility-level measures are not available, we urge researchers to control for
the factors that make a firm more likely to standardize including the heterogeneity of the
facilities in the firm’s portfolio.

34

REFERENCES
[1] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. “EPA-State Enforcement
Partnership Has Improved, but EPA’s Oversight Needs Further Enhancement.” GAO-07883.
[2] Kotchen, Matthew. 2013. Voluntary- and Information-Based Approaches to
Environmental Management: A Public Economics Perspective.” Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy 7(2): 276-295.
[3] Khanna, Madhu and Keith Brouhle. 2008. “Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental
Initiatives.” In Governing the Environment: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press (eds. M. Delmas and O. Young)
[4] Prakash, Aseem and Matthew Potoski. 2012. “Voluntary Environmental Programs: A
Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
31: 123–138.
[5] Lyon, Thomas and John Maxwell. 2007. “Environmental Public Voluntary Programs
Reconsidered.” Policy Studies Journal 35: 23–750.
[6] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1997. “EPA Strategic Plan.”
EPA/190-R-97 002.
[7] Pfaff, Alexander S. P. and Chris William Sanchirico. 2004. “Big Field, Small
Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of EPA’s Self-Audit Policy.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 23: 415-432.
[8] Short, Jodi and Michael Toffel. 2008. “Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the
Shadow of the Regulator.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 24(1): 45-71.
[9] Stafford, Sarah. 2007. “Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of
Environmental Self-Policing.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26: 305-326.
[10] Stafford, Sarah L. 2005. "Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit
Policy and Hazardous Waste Compliance." Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 6.
[11] Stafford, Sarah L. 2006. “State Adoption of Environmental Audit Initiatives.”
Contemporary Economic Policy 24(1): 172-187.
[12] Khanna, Madhu and Diah Widyawati. 2011. “Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The
Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies.” Review of Law and Economics
7: 129–163.

35

[13] Mishra Birendra K., D. Paul Newman and Christopher H. Stinson. 1997.
“Environmental Regulations and Incentives for Compliance Audits.” Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy 16: 187–214
[14] Pfaff, Alexander S. P. and Chris William Sanchirico. 2000. “Environmental SelfAuditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental
Harm.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16: 189-208.
[15] Friesen, Lana. 2006. “The Social Welfare Implications of Industry Self-auditing.”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51: 280-294.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1995. “Environmental Auditing: A Useful
Tool that Can Improve Environmental Performance and Reduce Cost Savings.”
GAO/RCED 95-37.
[17] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1999. “EPA/CMA Root Cause
Analysis Pilot Project: An Industry Survey,”
[18] Evans, Mary F., Lirong Liu, and Sarah Stafford. 2011. “Do Environmental Audits
Improve Long-term Compliance? Evidence from Manufacturing Facilities in Michigan.”
Journal of Regulatory Economics 40: 279-302.
[19] Earnhart, Dietrich, and Donna Ramirez Harrington. 2014. “The Role of
Environmental Audits in Reducing Water Effluent Levels.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 68(2):243–261.
[20] Bi, Xiang, and Madhu Khanna. 2012. “Reassessment of the Impact of the EPA's
Voluntary 33/50 Program on Toxic Releases.” Land Economics 88(2): 341-361.
[21] Vidovic, Martina, and Neha Khanna. 2012. “Is Voluntary Pollution Abatement in the
Absence of a Carrot or Stick Effective? Evidence from Facility Participation in the EPA’s
33/50 Program.” Environmental and Resource Economics 52(3): 369-393.
[22] Khanna, Madhu, and Lisa A. Damon. 1999. "EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program:
Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 31(1): 1-25.
[23] Vidovic, Martina, and Neha Khanna. 2007. "Can Voluntary Pollution Prevention
Programs Fulfill Their Promises? Further Evidence from the 33/50 Program." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 53(2): 180-195.
[24] Innes, Robert, and Abdoul G. Sam. 2008. "Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the
Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program." Journal
of Law and Economics 51(2): 271-96.

36

[25] Gamper-Rabindran, Shanti. 2006. "Did the EPA's Voluntary Industrial Toxics
Program Reduce Emissions? A GIS Analysis of Distributional Impacts and By-Media
Analysis of Substitution." Joumal of Environmental Economics and Management 52(1):
391-410.
[26] Sah, Raaj and Joseph Stiglitz. 1986. “The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies.” The American Economic Review 76: 716-727.
[27] Van Zandt, Timothy. 1999. “Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a
Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents.” The Review of Economic
Studies 66: 633-658
[28] Chang, Myong-Hun and Joseph Harrington. 2002. “Decentralized Business
Strategies in a Multi-Unit Firm.” Annals of Operations Research 109: 77–98.
[29] Hunnicutt, Lynn. 2001. “Mixups in the Warehouse: Centralized and Decentralized
Multi-plant Firms.” Economic Inquiry 39(4): 537-548.
[30] Evans, Mary F., Scott M. Gilpatric, Michael McKee, and Christian A. Vossler,
Managerial Incentives for Compliance with Environmental Information Disclosure
Programs, in "Experimental Methods, Environmental Economics" Routledge, UK (eds.
T. Cherry, J. Shogren, and S. Kroll), 244-260, 2008.
[31] Henriques, Irene, and Perry Sadorsky. 1996. “The Determinants of an
Environmentally Responsive Firm: An Empirical Approach.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 30: 381-395.
[32] Papke, Leslie E, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 1996. “Econometric Methods for
Fractional Response Variables with an Application to 401(k) Plan Participation Rates.”
Journal of Applied Econometrics 11: 619-632.
[33] Potoski, Matthew and Aseem Prakash. 2005. “Green Clubs and Voluntary
Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance.” American Journal of
Political Science 49: 235-248.
[34] de Marchi, Scott and James T. Hamilton. 2006. “Assessing the Accuracy of SelfReported Data: An Evaluation of the Toxics Release Inventory.” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty 32: 57-76.
[35] Laplante, Benoit and Paul Rilstone. 1996. “Environmental Inspections and
Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 31: 16-36.
[36] Shimshack, Jay P. and Michael B. Ward. 2005. “Regulator Reputation, Enforcement,
and Environmental Compliance.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
50: 519-540.

37

[37] Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
[38] Wilde, Joachim. 2000. “Identification of Multiple Equation Probit Models with
Endogenous Dummy Regressors.” Economics Letters 69(3): 309-312.

38

Table 1. Results of firm-level empirical analysis
Probit results—dependent
variable is Standardization

Industry
heterogeneity
Regulatory
heterogeneity
Size
heterogeneity
Public
# facilities
Constant

Sample
mean
(standard
deviation)
0.67
(0.42)
0.51
(0.43)
0.39
(0.42)
0.30
(0.46)
4.27
(6.47)
--

Estimated
coefficient
(robust
standard error)
-0.89*
(0.46)
-0.88*
(0.41)
-0.091
(0.80)
-0.80**
(0.31)
-0.060**
(0.018)
3.25**
(0.53)

Conditional
marginal effect
(Delta-method
standard error)
-0.026
(0.014)
-0.036*
(0.015)
-0.0080
(0.031)
-0.050**
(0.019)
-0.0057**
(0.0022)
--

Fractional logit
results—dependent
variable is fraction
of facilities audited
Estimated
coefficient
(robust standard
error)
0.047
(0.73)
0.15
(0.76)
0.37
(0.64)
0.95*
(0.50)
0.045
(0.027)
-3.62**
(1.02)

N=171, pseudo R2=0.22
For all variables except # facilities, conditional marginal effects are calculated as the
response for the change of going from a value of zero to a value of one (at the means of
the other variables). For # facilities, the conditional marginal effect is calculated at the
means of all the variables. * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates significance at
5%.
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for firm-level heterogeneity measures by
alignment between facility- and firm-level audit measures
Heterogeneity
measure

Firm audit measure
Firm audit 1 (at least one
Firm audit 2 (all facilities audit)
facility audits)
Firm-level
Firm-level
Firm-level
Firm-level
measure equal measure not
measure equal measure not
to facilityequal to
to facilityequal to
level measure facility-level
level measure facility-level
measure
measure
Industry
0.52
0.68
0.52
0.74
heterogeneity
(0.016)
(0.032)
(0.016)
(0.025)
Regulatory
0.40
0.68
0.40
0.73
heterogeneity
(0.015)
(0.21)
(0.015)
(0.020)
Size heterogeneity
0.30
0.46
0.31
0.41
(0.014)
(0.024)
(0.014)
(0.024)
Table reports means and standard deviations for heterogeneity measure listed in each row
by whether or not the facility-level audit measure is the same as the firm-level audit
measure for two different audit measures. All pairwise differences in means (i.e.,
between columns 2 and 3, 4 and 5) are significantly different at the 5% level.
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Table 3. Variable description and summary statistics for facility-level analysis of
environmental auditing
Variable name

Variable description

Facility-level variables
Comply
= 1 if facility reported complete compliance from 2nd
quarter 2004 through 1st quarter 2007, = 0 if facility was
out of compliance for one or more quarters
Facility Audit
= 1 if facility submitted at least one intent to audit notice
between 1998 and 2003
Employees
Number of employees at facility
Manufacturing = 1 if facility is classified as manufacturing (SIC codes
20 – 39)
Past inspection = 1 if facility was inspected at least once between 1994
and 1997
Count past
Number of times facility was inspected between 1994
inspection
and 1998
Past violation
= 1 if the facility was cited for a violation at least once
between 1994 and 1998
Past penalties
Total CAA penalties paid from 1994 to 1998, in $1,000s
Major
= 1 if facility is classified as a major air source
MACT
= 1 if facility is subject to MACT (maximum achievable
control technology).
PSD
= 1 if facility is subject to PSD (prevention of significant
deterioration)
NSR
= 1 if facility is subject to NSR (new source review)
NSPS
= 1 if facility is subject to NSPS (new source
performance standards)
SIP
= 1 if facility is classified as a SIP (state implementation
plan) source
CFC
= 1 if facility is subject to CFC tracking
CERCLIS
=1 if the facility is tracked in CERCLIS
ICIS
= 1 if facility is tracked ICIS
PCS
=1 if the facility is tracked in PCS
RCRA
= 1 if facility is regulated under RCRA
TRI
=1 if the facility is subject to TRI reporting
County-level variables
Nonattainment = 1 if facility is located in county that was classified as
non-attainment for ozone in 2004
County
Number of individuals in the county that belonged to the
conservancy
Nature Conservancy in 2005 per 1000 residents
County
Percentage of the voters in the county in the 2000
Republicans
Presidential election that voted Republican
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Mean

Standard
deviation

0.80

0.40

0.040

0.19

169.24
0.55

1013.35
0.50

0.42

0.49

0.97

1.62

0.049

0.22

31.91
0.15
0.071

571.45
0.36
0.26

0.049

0.22

0.0068
0.17

0.082
0.38

0.94

0.24

0.052
0.015
0.13
0.11
0.57
0.31

0.22
0.12
0.34
0.32
0.49
0.46

0.65

0.48

2.49

1.05

47.92

10.65

County
education

Percentage of the county’s population aged 25 and older
whose highest level of education achieved was high
school in 1990
Firm-level variables
Multi-facility
=1 if the firm (parent company) owns more than one
CAA-regulated facility in Michigan
Public
= 1 if firm (parent company) is publicly traded
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83.32

4.22

0.19

0.39

0.10

0.31

Table 4. Results of the facility-level analysis of environmental auditing

Variable name
Audit
Employees
Manufacturing
Past inspection

Audit equation
Model I
Model II
--

--

0.00011*
(0.000058)
-0.015
(0.12)
--

0.000094*
(0.000053)
0.0061
(0.13)
--

Past violation

--

--

Past inspection*Past violation

--

--

Count past inspections
Past penalties
Major
MACT
PSD
NSR
NSPS
SIP
CFC
CERCLIS
ICIS
PCS
RCRA
TRI
Nonattainment

-0.013
(0.027)
-0.00062
(0.00049)
0.37**
(0.14)
0.13
(0.16)
0.32*
(0.18)
-0.93*
(0.53)
0.078
(0.14)
0.56
(0.35)
0.47*
(0.24)
-5.08**
(0.35)
0.15
(0.11)
-0.041
(0.13)
0.44**
(0.15)
0.65**
(0.13)
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-0.026
(0.027)
-0.00057
(0.00044)
0.32**
(0.15)
0.25
(0.16)
0.37*
(0.19)
-1.019
(0.56)
0.034
(0.15)
0.52
(0.37)
0.38
(0.28)
-6.38**
(0.93)
0.14
(0.13)
-0.086
(0.14)
0.45**
(0.16)
0.58**
(0.14)
--

Compliance equation
Model I
Model II
1.41**
(0.25)
-0.00021**
(0.000078)
-0.015
(0.077)
-0.088
(0.074)
-0.023
(0.41)
0.13
(0.44)
--

-0.51
(0.87)
-0.00015
(0.000090)
-0.026
(0.082)
-0.10
(0.082)
-0.020
(0.44)
0.12
(0.48)
--

-0.00014
(0.00017)
-1.95**
(0.11)
-0.13
(0.13)
-0.32*
(0.18)
-0.23
(0.50)
-0.24**
(0.092)
0.71**
(0.18)
-1.04**
(0.20)
0.12
(0.34)
0.054
(0.11)
-0.086
(0.11)
0.077
(0.081)
-0.19**
(0.095)
-0.057

-0.00017
(0.00018)
-2.07**
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.14)
-0.28
(0.20)
-0.37
(0.52)
-0.21**
(0.097)
0.83**
(0.18)
-1.04**
(0.21)
-0.13
(0.33)
0.085
(0.12)
-0.14
(0.12)
0.15*
(0.08)
-0.038
(0.10)
-0.080

County conservancy

-0.077
(0.072)
-0.020**
(0.0055)
0.029
(0.020)
--

(0.073)
0.0092
(0.041)
0.016**
(0.0039)
0.014
(0.011)
--

(0.080)
0.0040
(0.041)
0.014**
(0.0044)
0.018
(0.012)
0.27*
(0.15)
-0.24**
(0.11)
-1.34
(0.87)
--

-0.11
(0.071)
County Republicans
-0.020**
(0.0056)
County education
0.035*
(0.021)
Public
0.21
(0.15)
Multi-facility
-0.53**
-(0.12)
Constant
-4.43**
-4.99**
-1.05
(1.47)
(1.53)
(0.84)
Rho
-0.82**
0.14
-(0.096)
(0.41)
Log L
-1168.60
-1150.76
--Table reports estimated coefficients and robust standard errors, below coefficients in
parentheses. Sample size is 2811. * indicates significance at 10% and ** indicates
significance at 5%.
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APPENDIX. Description of heterogeneity measures
Industry heterogeneity
The dataset contains up to three four-digit SIC codes for each facility. Let SIC1, SIC2,
SIC3 represent these variables. Three steps are required to create Industry heterogeneity.
Step 1:
Sort facilities by parent company identifier, SIC1, SIC2, SIC3. Create a variable, called
Industry duplicates, that equals zero if a particular sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 is
unique among facilities within a parent company. Otherwise, Industry duplicates assigns
a count to identify the number of times a particular sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 shows
up within facilities owned by the parent company (i.e., the first facility with the sequence
will have Industry duplicates equal to one, the second facility with that same sequence
will have Industry duplicates equal to two, and so on). Consider a hypothetical example
firm that owns five facilities with values for SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 given in the following
table (-- indicates a missing value):
Facility ID
SIC1
SIC2
SIC3
Industry
duplicates
1
30
37
-0
2
20
--1
3
20
24
26
0
4
20
--2
5
20
--3
Two sequences of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3 are unique within the facilities owned by this firm
(30, 37, --; 20, 24, 26) so the facilities with these sequences (1 and 3) are assigned values
of Industry duplicates equal to zero. One sequence, 20, --, --, occurs three times, first for
facility 2 (so Industry duplicates=1), second for facility 4 (so Industry duplicates=2), and
third for facility 5 (so Industry duplicates=3).
Step 2:
Identify the maximum value of Industry duplicates among facilities owned by each
parent company. Call this Max industry duplicates. Note that if a firm has Max industry
duplicates equal to Num facilities (the # of facility owned by the parent company), then
all facilities owned by that parent company have the same values for the sequence SIC1,
SIC2, SIC3. If Max industry duplicates is equal to zero, then each facility owned by the
firm has a unique sequence of SIC1, SIC2, SIC3.
Step 3:
Form Industry heterogeneity for each firm using the following:
Num facilities − Max industry duplicates
Industry heterogeneity =
.
Num facilities
Since the range of Max industry duplicates is zero to Num facilities for each firm,
Industry heterogeneity is bounded between zero and one where zero indicates
homogeneity (i.e., Max industry duplicates = Num facilities ) and one indicates the
largest degree of heterogeneity (i.e., Max industry duplicates = 0 ).
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Regulatory heterogeneity
This measure is formed using an analogous three step method. However, we are
interested in the values of the sequence of five variables: CERCLIS, ICIS, PCS, RCRA,
TRI. If Max regulatory duplicates represent the maximum value of Regulatory duplicates
(where this measure is formed as described above), then
Num facilities − Max regulatory duplicates
Regulatory heterogeneity =
.
Num facilities
Size heterogeneity
This measure uses only one variable, rather than a sequence of variables as the other two
measures so forming it is more straightforward. We use Employees, the number of
employees at the facility, to create a categorical variable, Cat employees where
1 if Employees ≤ 10
2 if 10 < Employees ≤ 100

Cat employees = 
3 if 100 < Employees ≤ 500
4 if 500 < Employees
We then create a variable for each facility, Employee duplicates, formed using the same
method as described above, based on the values of Cat employees at the facilities owned
by a given parent company. Letting Max employee duplicates represent the maximum
value of Employee duplicates among facilities owned by a parent company, we form Size
heterogeneity using the same technique as with the other two heterogeneity measures:
Num facilities − Max employee duplicates
Size heterogeneity =
Num facilities
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